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1 Introduction
During the financial crisis of 2007–09, most EU states did not have effective bank
resolution and recovery regimes to ensure an orderly restructuring or winding-up of a
failing bank or financial institution. When a number of major European banks began
to fail in 2008, including Fortis, Dexia and the Royal Bank of Scotland, the absence
of an effective resolution and recovery framework led EU Member State authorities
to engage in a chaotic scramble to freeze and seize assets located in their jurisdic-
tions in order to pay creditors and depositors of distressed financial institutions in
their countries. Moreover, national authorities resorted to ad hoc measures to pro-
vide state guarantees and inject capital into failing financial institutions.1 The crisis
demonstrated the EU’s lack of a clear and predictable legal framework to govern
how a distressed financial institution would be reorganized or liquidated in an orderly
manner without undermining financial stability.
To address this, the European Commission published a Communication in 2009
on an ‘EU Framework for Cross-Border Crisis Management in the Banking Sector’,
which analysed gaps and weaknesses in the EU legal framework governing bank reso-
lution.2 In December 2010, the Council of Ministers (ECOFIN) adopted conclusions
calling for a more comprehensive Union framework to regulate financial markets,
including crisis prevention, management and resolution. After further consultation,
on 6 June 2012 the European Commission proposed a Directive on a Framework for
Bank Recovery and Resolution (RRD).3 The RRD provides new resolution tools and
powers for Member State supervisory authorities to ensure that uninterrupted access
to deposits and payment transactions is maintained during periods of market stress
or when an individual bank or banking group becomes insolvent.4 Member State au-
thorities would be empowered to sell viable assets of the bank and to apportion losses
in an equitable and organized manner by requiring, for example, that certain credi-
tors incur losses on their claims against the distressed financial firm. The RRD is not
intended to replace Member State bank insolvency laws and regulations, but rather to
enhance and provide minimum powers across the EU for Member State authorities
to require banks and financial groups to recapitalize or restructure creditor claims
during periods of market stress in order to reduce the likelihood of a bank becom-
1According to the IMF estimates, crisis-related losses incurred by European banks between 2007 and 2010
were close to €1 trillion or 8 % of the EU GDP. In addition, between October 2008 and October 2011,
the Commission approved €4.5 trillion (equivalent to 37 % of EU GDP) of state aid measures to financial
institutions. See http://www.g20.org/images/stories/docs/eng/washington.pdf (last visited 9 August 2012).
2Commission Communication on an EU Framework for Cross-Border Crisis Management in the Banking
Sector, COM(2009) 561 final.
3Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a frame-
work for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms, COM(2012) 280/3.
4The European Commission proposal has incorporated some of the international standards on bank res-
olution adopted by the Financial Stability Board, ‘Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for
Financial Institutions’, (July 2011) (BIS: Basel). See http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/
r_111104cc.pdf (last visited 8 August 2012).
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ing insolvent and to mitigate the impact of a bank resolution or insolvency on the
financial system.5
The article reviews recent proposals to establish a European Banking Union by
considering the creation of the Single Supervisory Mechanism and the ECB as bank
supervisor. It then critically analyses the draft Directive on Bank Recovery and Res-
olution (RRD) and argues that it is inadequate to serve as one of the pillars of bank-
ing union. The article reviews the difficulties of Member States in implementing the
RRD and analyses the UK as a case study. The article finally suggests that although
strengthened powers for national resolution authorities are necessary to enhance the
RRD, the logic of banking union demands further centralisation of sovereign author-
ity in managing resolution and recovery at the EU or Euro area level to provide a
more coherent institutional relationship with the ECB/SSM in banking supervision.
Yet, risks remain as further centralisation of banking union powers could result in
a deepening split in the EU internal market between EU states not participating in
banking union and EU states that are participating in banking union.
2 The Banking Union proposals—the RRD in context
In June 2012, as Spanish and Italian bond interest rates were rapidly climbing, Span-
ish Finance Ministry officials reached an agreement in principle with the European
Commission over the terms of a Eurozone bailout of the Spanish banking system.
This led the European Union President, Herman van Rompuy, to issue a paper calling
for a European Banking Union that would sever the vicious link between the banking
crisis and sovereign debt crisis.6 The Van Rompuy paper called for an integrated EU
financial framework that should consist of three pillars: ‘single European banking su-
pervision and a common deposit insurance and resolution framework.’7 The German
Chancellor Angela Merkel welcomed the proposals as an important step in obtain-
ing German support for allowing the Eurozone bailout fund—the European Stability
Mechanism—to recapitalise ailing Eurozone banks. After the European Council of
Ministers issued a Decision supporting the Van Rompuy proposal,8 the European
Commission proposed on 12 September 2012 a Regulation9 that would provide the
European Central Bank with banking supervision powers and another Regulation to
enable the ECB to interact with the European Banking Authority in exercising its
bank supervisory powers.10 On 19 October 2012, President Van Rompuy endorsed
5See RRD, Recital 1 provides ‘adequate tools to prevent the insolvency of credit institutions or, when
insolvency occurs, to minimise negative repercussions by preserving systemically important functions of
the failing institution’.
6Council, Conclusions, 29 June 2012, EUCO 76/12., p. 3.
7European Council President, ‘Towards A Genuine Economic and Monetary Union’, 26 June 2012, EUCO
120/12, pp. 3–4.
8Council, Conclusions, 29 June 2012, EUCO 76/12, p. 3.
9Commission, Proposal for a Council Regulation conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank
concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions, COM(2012) 511 final,
Brussels, 12.9.2012.
10Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regu-
lation (EU) No 1093/2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority).
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the Commission’s legislative proposals to create a Single Supervisory Mechanism
(SSM) ‘to prevent banking risks and cross-border contagion from emerging’ and for
the ECB ‘to carry out supervision directly’ by ‘using national supervisors in regular
supervisory tasks as much as possible.’11 Member states continued further negotia-
tions in November 2012 addressing specific issues, such as the separation of monetary
policy and banking supervision within the ECB, the SSM’s institutional structure and
decision-making procedures, the scope of the ECB’s competence to conduct banking
supervision and its enforcement powers, and the ECB’s interaction with the Euro-
pean Banking Authority in adopting draft regulatory standards and in voting modal-
ities. Council reached agreement on these and other issues on 4 December 2012 by
approving final language for the proposed Regulation.12
The ECB’s supervisory powers would become fully operational by January 2014
with the creation of a Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) that would have an ex-
ecutive board—a Single Supervisory Board (SSB)—that would be responsible for
supervising Eurozone banks that have accepted bailouts. The ECB/SSB’s supervi-
sory responsibilities would be extended to the biggest cross-border credit institutions
and financial holding companies. National competent authorities will have primary
responsibility to supervise an estimated 6000 smaller domestic credit institutions and
financial groups in the Euro area and participating EU states with the ECB having
the power to intervene in supervisory matters only in exceptional circumstances.13
The ECB/SSB will be primarily responsible for licensing, monitoring and enforc-
ing prudential regulations, such as capital adequacy requirements, liquidity buffers
and leverage limits, against banks based in the Eurozone.14 The ECB/SSB will also
be empowered to approve bank recovery plans and asset transfers between affiliates
within banking groups or mixed financial conglomerates.15
The Commission’s proposals for the ECB to exercise competence to supervise
credit institutions in the Euro area through the SSM represent a dramatic institutional
restructuring of EU banking supervision which will have important implications for
the practice of financial regulation in all EU states. Indeed, the proposed Banking
Union in the Euro area is designed to sever the link between banking fragility and
over-indebted sovereign debtors by authorising the European Stability Mechanism
(the Eurozone’s bailout fund) to recapitalise ailing Euro area banks on the condi-
tion that these banks are subject to ECB supervision and strict conditionality. The
ECB/SSM proposals, however, are not intended to stand alone, as they were envis-
aged to be the first pillar of three pillars in a comprehensive banking union. The other
11European Council President, ‘Remarks by President Van Rompuy following the first session of the
European Council’, 19 October 2012, EUCO 193/12, pp. 1–2.
12Council Conclusions, 4 December 2012, ECOFIN 1011.
13Commission Proposal for a Council Regulation conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank
concerning the policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions, Art 27 (1) & (2),
2012/0242 (CNS), ECOFIN 1011, Brussels, 3.12.2012.
14Commission, Proposal for a Council Regulation conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank
concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions, Art 4 (1)–(4), COM(2012)
511 final, Brussels, 12.9.2012. The Regulation was subjected to final amendments approved by EU Heads
of State on 11 December 2012.
15Art 4 (1)(k).
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two pillars that are expected to follow in due course are, namely, a common resolu-
tion mechanism and a common deposit insurance scheme possibly under the control
of a common resolution authority. Even as the proposal for a SSM emerged, however,
some countries led by Germany resisted the prospect that the other two pillars would
be implemented quickly. This led to President Van Rompuy conceding that whilst
the common resolution mechanism and common deposit insurance scheme remain
essentials pillars for banking union, there is no consensus on their introduction.
The October 2012 EU Summit further reinforced this disagreement on when bank-
ing union would be fully adopted by simply noting that the Commission’s intention
to propose a single resolution mechanism for EU states participating in the SSM will
only occur once the existing drafting Recovery and Resolution Directive and pro-
posed Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive had been adopted.16 It is now time to
examine the main provisions of the proposed RRD.
3 The draft Recovery and Resolution Directive (RRD)
The legal basis for RRD is Article 114 of the Lisbon Treaty (TFEU) which provides
for the establishment of EU bodies and institutions that are vested with responsi-
bilities for contributing to the harmonization of laws and facilitating their uniform
implementation by Member States.17 The RRD attempts to improve the conditions
for the establishment and functioning of the internal market by proposing minimum
harmonizing legislation that delegates authority to the European Banking Authority
(EBA) to draft and propose technical implementing standards for Member States to
adopt for their recovery and resolution regimes. These tasks conferred on the EBA
are closely linked to the subject matter of the RRD, which is to promote more har-
monized Member State recovery and resolution practices that will reduce barriers to
the internal market.
The RRD’s scope of application extends widely to include all credit institutions,
investment firms subject to capital requirements of at least €730,000, any financial
institution engaged in a wide range of financial services which is a subsidiary of a
credit institution and which is subject to consolidated supervision at the level of the
parent company.18 Throughout the Directive, the term ‘institution’ is used generally
to signify an entity subject to the RRD requirements. The Directive defines ‘institu-
tion’ to be a credit institution or investment firm defined as a €730,000 firm. The
RRD’s coverage runs parallel with the Capital Requirements Directive,19 which har-
monizes capital, liquidity, and governance arrangements for financial institutions and
16Council, Conclusions, October 2012, EUCO.
17See Case C-66/04 United Kingdom v. European Parliament (Smoke Flavourings) [2005] ECR I-10553,
Case C–217/04 United Kingdom v. European Parliament (ENISA) [2006] ECR I-3771.
18RRD, Article 1. A €730k firm is defined as such under Article 9 of Directive 2006/49/EC (the Recast
Capital Adequacy Directive).
19Directive 2006/48/EC relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions, [2010]
OJ C 293/1; and Directive 2006/49/EC on the capital adequacy of investment firms and credit institutions,
[2009] OJ L 94/97.
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banking groups established in an EU Member State. The CRD is a maximum har-
monization directive, the requirements of which Member States may not depart from
except in specified circumstances, whereas the RRD is a minimum harmonization
directive based mainly on general principles and powers to be adopted by Member
States into their domestic legal frameworks with considerable discretion for which
legal instruments they use to comply with the Directive. Member State authorities
will be required to implement most requirements of the RRD by 1 January 2015,
whilst the Directive’s more controversial bail-in requirements discussed below must
be implemented by 1 January 2018.
Each Member State is required to designate a resolution authority at the level of the
member state to exercise powers under the RRD.20 States are free to decide whether
or not the resolution authority will be a separate authority or combined with some
other institutional authority, such as the bank regulator. However, where supervisory
and resolution authorities are located within the same institutional structure, func-
tional separation and independence between the authorities must be demonstrated
and there must be safeguards against conflicts of interests.
Each financial institution, covered investment firm and parent entity subject to
consolidated supervision will be required to prepare a recovery plan as a condition
for authorization.21 Article 4 prescribes certain information to be provided in the re-
covery plan. The Directive also requires that the EBA propose and the Commission
adopt technical implementation standards on the minimum content to be provided by
institutions in their recovery plans.22 Article 5 requires institutions to submit their
recovery plans for approval to the resolution authority. In reviewing the proposed
recovery plan, the resolution authority must consider whether the plan can restore
the firm’s viability and financial soundness in difficult market circumstances without
having adverse impact on the financial system. Recovery plans will contain infor-
mation addressing business strategy, organizational structure of the firm, expected
funding sources, and risk management. Authorities have the power to require firms
to adopt any measure which the authority believes is necessary to overcome potential
impediments or deficiencies in the implementation of the firm’s plan.
The requirement to prepare and maintain a recovery plan also applies to parent
companies and subsidiaries subject to consolidated supervision. This means each in-
stitution within or which is part of the financial group is required to prepare a recovery
plan consisting of the elements and arrangements set forth in Article 5. These plans
must also provide the details of any arrangements for intra-group financial support
for entities within the group that are experiencing financial difficulties.23 The group
recovery plan must be submitted for review by the lead supervisor of the consolidated
group and by any competent authorities where the group has significant operations.
20Article 3 RRD.
21Article 5 RRD. The EU Council has proposed to amend article 7 RRD to require that group recovery
plans be required only for the group as a whole and individually for significant entities in the group.
22European Banking Authority, EBA Discussion Paper on a template for recovery plans, 15 May 2012
(EBA/DP/2012/2) (containing draft template with information to be provided in recovery plan).
23Article 16 RRD.
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The recovery plan must be approved and endorsed by the board of directors of the in-
stitution (or equivalent managerial body).24 In the case of a financial group, the board
of the parent company or group subject to consolidated supervision, and the board of
each institution within the group, must approve the group recovery plan before it is
approved by the resolution authority.
The resolution authority will be required to develop resolution plans for each fi-
nancial institution that is not part of a group and for each group subject to consoli-
dated supervision.25 Unlike the recovery plans, which are prepared by the regulated
entity and the group holding company, the resolution plans are prepared by the reso-
lution authority in consultation with the regulated entity and group. Resolution plans
are required to show how crucial payment functions and business lines can be sep-
arated economically and legally so as to ensure continuity of the bank’s services to
depositors and other customers. The plan must also provide an assessment of the
institution’s resolvability and a list of measures to address or remove impediments
to resolvability. A feasibility assessment of alternative resolution strategies and how
they could be financed without the assumption of extraordinary public support must
be included, along with an analysis of the impact of the plan on other institutions
within the group. 26
The resolution plan of the financial group shall consist of resolution plans for the
parent company or institution subject to consolidated supervision and for each institu-
tion or firm within the group.27 The resolution authority responsible for consolidated
supervision of the group is responsible for preparing the resolution plan jointly with
the resolution authorities of the subsidiaries and to coordinate within resolution col-
leges that will operate under the aegis of the EBA. The financial institutions will be
required to provide the authorities with the information necessary to write the reso-
lution plan. The authorities will be required to update the resolution plan annually or
after any event which could have a material effect on the plan. The EBA will propose
guidelines and technical standards seeking to promote supervisory convergence in the
development of resolution plans and in proposing scenarios to be used for testing the
robustness of resolution plans. The RRD envisages that the resolution plans should
be able to respond to a range of market developments including idiosyncratic risks
and market-wide stress scenarios.
The RRD contains a number of other important provisions that will be briefly
mentioned. Articles 31–64 authorize Member State authorities to apply resolution
tools against financial institutions and groups when they do not satisfy prudential
standards, or when certain early intervention trigger points are met. For example,
the authority can compel the institution to sell a business, or an institution can have
all or part of its assets transferred to a ‘bridge institution’, usually state-owned. The
authority can also engage in asset separation by transferring viable assets to third
party purchasers, thus allowing non-viable assets to be wound down in the rump
institution or in a bridge bank. Authorities will also be encouraged to use bail-in





measures that allow institutions to recapitalize themselves whilst in distress by im-
posing losses on priority creditors and other unsecured creditors according to their
ranking only after shareholders’ interests have been extinguished. Depositor claims
will be treated pari passu along with priority unsecured creditors.28 Articles 16–
19 create the legal concept of ‘group interest’, that each member of the corpo-
rate group has an indirect interest in the prosperity of the rest of the group, and
that intra-group financial support from one subsidiary to another would be permit-
ted and in some circumstances could be required by the bank supervisor or resolu-
tion authority if they considered such support to be necessary to maintain or sta-
bilise the group. Any company law provisions that prioritise the interests of the
subsidiary over that of the group, thereby posing an obstacle to intra-group trans-
fers, would be superseded. In short, intra-group support provided pursuant to a re-
covery or resolution plan could not result in a breach of national law restrictions
on intra-group support. The RRD requires Member States to allow groups to enter
into agreements for intra-group financial assistance in the form of loans, guarantees,
and collateral provision to support third party transactions so long as certain con-
ditions are met, including, inter alia, that the financial support has the objective of
preserving or restoring the financial stability of the group as a whole. The resolu-
tion authority must approve such agreements and determine that they will not result
in the parties breaching their capital and liquidity requirements or becoming insol-
vent.
4 Member state implementation—the UK approach to resolution
The UK Banking Act 2009 provides a state of the art regime for resolution of deposit-
taking banks and building societies. As mentioned above, the RRD draws consider-
ably on the principles and practices set forth in the UK’s special resolution regime.
The Banking Act’s special resolution regime creates a special resolution authority
(SRA) within the Bank of England that can decide how to resolve a bank or building
society which has not complied with applicable prudential regulatory requirements.
The SRA can exercise stabilization powers to transfer property and shares from a
failing bank to a state-owned bridge bank or private bank, or place the bank into
temporary public ownership with the consent of the Treasury. Although the exer-
cise of these resolution powers can substantially interfere with shareholder rights
and other property rights, these powers have the objective of striking a balance
between the legitimate rights of bank shareholders, creditors and depositors while
preventing a failing bank from causing a systemic crisis and threatening depositor
rights.
The UK SRR has been criticised on the grounds that it does not provide an ad-
equate resolution framework for large or too-big-to-fail banks.29 Indeed, the opera-
28This conflicts with the UK Independent Commission on Banking (Vickers’ Commission) proposals
which would give retail deposit creditors a priority over the bank’s unsecured bondholders. The UK Trea-
sury has incorporated the depositor preference rule as a provision in the UK Banking Bill 2013.
29In a recent report, the International Monetary Fund concluded that certain features of the UK SRR—
particularly property transfer arrangements to the private sector—could be used to resolve other types of
financial firms.
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tional complexity, jurisdictional issues, and political sensitivity of resolving a large
cross-border bank requires a more robust transnational approach. The UK Finan-
cial Services Bill (Banking) 2013 attempts to address some of these weaknesses by
adopting the proposals of the Independent Commission on Banking (ICB), namely,
to ring-fence by subsidiarisation UK banks’ retail deposit-taking from the rest of
the banking group (including separation from investment banking); to impose higher
loss-absorbing capital requirements on UK retail bank subsidiaries; and to grant cred-
itor preference to insured deposits with the retail subsidiary.
Another gap in the UK resolution regime is that it does not cover investment
banks, insurance firms, financial groups and conglomerates. Although the Financial
Services Act 2010 provides powers to support recovery and resolution planning, it
does not require UK retail deposit-taking institutions or other UK financial firms
to have recovery plans, nor does it subject insurance and investment firms and fi-
nancial conglomerates (excluding a bank subsidiary) to the resolution regime. The
RRD would address this by requiring member states to extend their special resolu-
tion regimes to certain investment banks, insurance firms and financial conglomer-
ates and groups. The UK Treasury conducted a consultation in 2012 that addressed
whether or not the UK SRR should go beyond the minimum harmonisation require-
ments of the RRD by extending the recovery and resolution framework to potentially
systemic financial infrastructure, such clearing houses, payment systems, and secu-
rities settlement institutions.30 The UK Treasury concluded that any extension of
the UK recovery and resolution regime beyond that already established under the
Banking Act 2009 for deposit-taking institutions should cover diversified financial
groups, including the entities or infrastructure which they own or control in the Eu-
ropean Union. To avoid regulatory arbitrage, the UK recommends that recovery and
resolution planning be mandatory for stand-alone exchanges, clearing houses and
settlement institutions. Indeed, the new regulatory requirements for centralised clear-
ing of standardised derivative contracts will result in central counterparties becom-
ing systemic actors in the financial system because of the breadth and complexity
of their operations and cross-border interconnectedness with other CCPs and settle-
ment institutions. Similarly, recovery and resolution plans for international central
securities depositories (e.g., Euroclear and Clearstream) and national central secu-
rities depositories are necessary because they perform systemic functions in both
the global and European financial systems. ICSDs, such as Euroclear, perform vi-
tal settlement operations in the securities markets and are linked to the ECB’s Tar-
get2 Securities system which provides certainty in delivery versus payment of elec-
tronic securities transactions. The RRD should clarify that Member State supervi-
sors or resolution authorities should have the competence to require entities that
provide financial infrastructure to adopt and comply with recovery and resolution
plans.
30The Treasury’s consultation concluded that the UK special resolution regime should extend to insur-
ance and investment services firms, and financial conglomerates and groups. UK Treasury Consultation,
Financial sector resolution: broadening the regime, Cm 8419 (HM Treasury: August 2012).
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5 Enhancing the RRD in the Banking Union
Although the RRD’s detailed requirements for recovery and resolution plans are im-
portant steps for improving Member State resolution regimes, these measures are
incremental at best and do not go far enough in providing the clear legal authority
for Member States to exercise the necessary intervention tools to require bank man-
agement to undertake certain actions, such as recapitalizing the bank or restricting
dividends, when it is in breach of prudential standards or when it poses a risk to fi-
nancial stability. The RRD proposes harmonized principles and enumerates a set of
resolution tools that encourage Member State authorities to intervene in the institu-
tion’s risk management and strategy, but Member States are free to adopt divergent
approaches in deciding both whether and when to use these tools. Although the EBA
will publish guidelines on how and when Member State authorities should use res-
olution tools, Member States will have ultimate discretion to decide whether or not
to adopt these tools in their legal and regulatory frameworks. This may create incen-
tives for states to adopt light touch approaches to resolution practice and potentially
lead to regulatory arbitrage within the Union and undermine the internal market. The
Commission recognizes this by stating expressly that the draft Directive provides a
minimum harmonization framework that is meant to allow Member States to exper-
iment with different resolution approaches and to use their discretion in exercising
resolution powers.
Nevertheless, more legal certainty should be provided that establishes clearly that
the resolution tools supersede existing domestic law and related EU law. It is not
enough to provide a harmonized set of principles and a proposed resolution frame-
work to be applied in a discretionary manner by Member States. An effective EU
resolution regime must consist of precise legal powers for Member State authorities
to impose specific corrective measures on weak and failing financial institutions and
groups at the early intervention stage before insolvency.
Another weakness with the current proposal is that it has been overtaken by events
with Council’s approval in December 2012 of the Regulation conferring supervisory
powers on the ECB. The Regulation envisions future legislation that would introduce
a common resolution mechanism for banks and financial institutions established in
participating EU states in the SSM. It further envisions that the ECB would eventually
either act as a resolution authority, or it would oversee and direct an entity controlled
by it that would serve as a resolution authority, that would operate the common res-
olution mechanism. The common resolution mechanism would eventually become a
common resolution fund for EU states participating in the SSM. As discussed above,
the RRD requires member states to establish national resolution funds, which will
require ex ante levies on banks and investment firms. The RRD’s minimum har-
monisation approach essentially rejects the notion of an EU-wide resolution fund
as impracticable. Yet, the Commission’s September 2012 paper, A Roadmap towards
Banking Union, argued that a single resolution mechanism
“would be more efficient than a network of national resolution authorities, in
particular in the case of cross-border failures, given the need for speed and
credibility in addressing banking crises. It would be a natural complement to
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the establishment of a single supervisory mechanism. It would also entail sig-
nificant economies of scale, and avoid the negative externalities that may derive
from purely national decisions.” 31
The RRD therefore is not fully consistent with the logic of the SSM’s aim to
create a common resolution mechanism. Indeed, the Regulation creating the SSM
is an important shift away from the harmonisation model of EU regulation which
Member States have opted for in recent years in much of their financial regulation
legislation. The RRD encapsulates the harmonisation (albeit from a minimum har-
monisation perspective) of the legal framework governing recovery and resolution.
However, the SSM/banking union proposals represent an alternative model that en-
shrines the concept of centralisation of sovereign authority that provides the ECB
with competence to supervise all banks established in participating states in the SSM.
The Commission’s Roadmap towards Banking Union envisions an expansion of the
ECB/SSM’s competence for banking supervision to include a common resolution
mechanism and common deposit guarantee scheme.32 Tensions exist, however, be-
tween Member States regarding which model is more appropriate, as the RRD har-
monisation model would apply to EU states not participating in the SSM whereas
a common resolution mechanism would presumably apply only to Members States
who decided to participate in the SSM and banking union.
Some EU regulatory officials are calling for ‘stronger steps in the euro area to-
wards a common resolution mechanism—maybe also a common resolution author-
ity.’33 This view is premised on the notion that stability in the Eurozone requires
supervision, resolution and deposit insurance and monetary policy to be conducted
institutionally at the euro area level. Indeed, there is a concern that certain inconsis-
tencies would arise if supervision is conducted by a EU or euro area authority but
resolution is conducted at the national level; this could lead to inconsistent policies;
for instance, where there is a supervisory failure by a EU authority, a national res-
olution authority might decide not to spend its taxpayers’ money to rectify the EU
authority’s supervisory mistakes. On the other hand, there is the view that a single
resolution mechanism is not ‘inevitable’ nor ‘absolutely necessary’, whilst there are
other views that consider a common resolution mechanism to be necessary only for
large cross-border systemically important banks and financial institutions.
The legal, political and institutional complexity of establishing a common resolu-
tion mechanism should be recognised; however, if the goal of EU policymakers is to
break the destructive link between banks and sovereign states then it may be neces-
sary to revise the RRD substantially so that resolution and bank supervision in the
SSM can be exercised in a more institutionally coherent and coordinated manner. Al-
though the RRD is an important—albeit incremental—step towards strengthening EU
banking supervision and regulation, the harmonisation model it sets forth—namely
minimum harmonisation—is no longer adequate to ensure effective macro-prudential
31Commission Communication, COM(2012) 510 final.
32Ibid., p. 15.
33See Oral evidence of Andrea Enria, Chairman of the Supervisory Board, European Banking Authority,
before House of Lords Subcommittee on Europe (Economic and Finance): European Banking Union: Key
Issues and Challenges, 7th Report of Session 2012–13.
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supervision and regulation of EU financial markets. The potential move, however, to-
wards further banking union with a common resolution mechanism and a common
deposit scheme runs the grave risk of deepening the growing split and division within
the EU single market for financial services.
Any consideration of the RRD should be undertaken within the broader context
of the ongoing Eurozone sovereign debt and banking crisis and the decision by EU
Heads of State in December 2012 to establish the first pillar of banking union: the
SSM. Moreover, it is envisaged that the ECB could be involved in providing liquidity
support to banks and financial groups subject to a resolution procedure and future leg-
islation could authorise the ECB to administer a euro area resolution fund. It is clear
therefore that the proposed RRD Directive will be part of a broader policy and legisla-
tive package that will undoubtedly include major changes to EU banking regulation,
supervision and resolution. This will undoubtedly result in substantial revisions to
the RRD.
6 Conclusion
The European Commission’s proposed Directive on a Bank Recovery and Resolution
Framework is an important step toward building a more effective cross-border EU
regulatory regime. It contains important principles that provide the basis to build a
stronger EU resolution regime. However, clearer and more specific powers are needed
for national resolution authorities to intervene in the operations of financial institu-
tions so that they do not pose a serious risk to taxpayer funds. Effective prudential
regulation and supervision requires a seamless process between the use of crisis pre-
vention measures and crisis management powers, including recovery and resolution
measures, for financial institutions in distress. The RRD proposal recognises the im-
portant link between crisis prevention and crisis management and therefore supports
other important regulatory reforms designed to stabilize the European financial sys-
tem. Nevertheless, this article suggests that although the RRD represents an important
step in reforming the EU bank resolution regime, Member State supervisors should
be given stronger powers to impose prompt corrective measures on failing banks and
financial groups.
In addition, the ECB is expected to have authority to ensure compliance with Eu-
ropean banking rules, such as capital adequacy. The Commission’s proposal however
does not address how the ECB’s vast new supervisory powers will interact with mem-
ber state resolution powers, nor does it address the legal question of whether it can do
so under the Treaty.34 However, assuming SSM is constitutional, EU policymakers
34Article 127 (6) of the EU Treaty provides that: “The Council, acting by means of regulations in accor-
dance with a special legislative procedure, may unanimously, and after consulting the European Parliament
and the European Central Bank, confer specific tasks upon the European Central bank concerning policies
relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and other financial institutions with the excep-
tion of insurance undertakings.” Under EU law, European institutions have legal competence to exercise
powers that are specifically conferred. Under article 127 (6), the ECB does not have the conferred power to
exercise supervision over credit institutions unless it is provided by unanimous consent of EU states. The
Regulation granting bank supervisory powers to the ECB relies on Article 127 (6). According to Article
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are confronted with the dilemma of whether they can centralise sovereign authority
for the supervision of banks and other financial institutions with the ECB, yet main-
taining a Member State driven resolution regime based on minimum harmonisation
principles. Also, the need for burden-sharing amongst countries affected by possi-
ble fiscal costs of recapitalization must also be considered, as well as the imperative
to minimize bailout costs for taxpayers. These outstanding issues suggest that con-
tinued work on a European Banking Union is urgently needed in order to design a
more effective institutional framework that can achieve regulatory objectives while
overcoming outstanding legal issues.
127 (6), however, the ECB can only have supervisory powers conferred on it ‘concerning policies relating
to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and other financial institutions with the exception of
insurance undertakings.’ This means it can only have bank supervisory powers conferred on it under this
provision, not resolution powers, as suggested by President van Rompuy and the Commission.
